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Michael Bruce Barton 
The Housing Industry and Union Power: 
An Economic Analysis 
Michael Barton is a third-year student at 
Yale Law School. 
In October, 1972, there was every expec-
tation that the issue of the anticompeti-
tive influence of construction trades unions 
on the low- and moderate-income housing 
industry1 would be hotly debated over the 
next few years. Two recent actions by 
President Nixon have mooted the issue for 
the present. 
The first move was the nomination of 
Peter Brennan, President of the New York 
State Building and Construction Trades 
Council, as Secretary of Labor, presumably 
as a reward for his support of the President 
during the recent campaign.2 The Labor 
Department's role is critical in at least two 
areas - enforcement of the Antidiscrimi-
nation programs on federally-supported 
building construction3 and administration 
of the Davis-Bacon Act, a major source of 
the ability of the building trades unions 
to_maintain high wage rates. 
The second move was the announcement 
by outgoing Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development, George Romney, of 
the moratorium on Federal subsidies to 
housing, as of January 5, 1973 .4 During 
1972, 500,000 new housing units were 
built under the various Federal low- and 
moderate-income housing direct subsidy 
programs, a figure representing 25% of 
the total number of housing starts that 
year.5 So important to the construction 
of such housing are these subsidies,6 that 
it is unlikely that low-income housing can 
be built without them. In New York City, 
(qonstruction costs in the City are so high 
that it is considered impossible to build 
multifamily housing in marketable areas at a 
cost that would permit rents under $125 to 
$140 a room a month without some form of 
government assistance. Local authorities have 
relied heavily on the Federal Government 
for help in bringing rents down to levels 
within the means of middle-income families. 7 
On a national level, it has been predicted 
by a newly formed "coalition of organiza-
tions interested in housing programs"8 
that the effect of the housing subsidy 
moratorium would be a 15.5% reduction 
in residential construction, a 1.3% cut in 
the GNP, loss of almost 2 million jobs, an 
increase in the cost of single and multi-
family homes, increases in rents for con-
ventional apartments and a virtual stand-
still in the rehabilitation of existing hous-
ing9 ·- almost all of these effects hitting 
most directly at those who occupy sub-
standard housing presently. 10 The budget 
for Fiscal Year 1974, beginning on July 1st 
of this year, continues the moratorium.11 
Despite the freeze on government activity 
in the low cost housing area, the issue of 
the trades unions' role in the construction 
industry merits close analysis. The national 
commitment to providing every American 
with a decent home remains, but unions 
comprise one barrier to the attainment of 
that goal. 
Craft unions in the contract construction 
industry have extraordinary power to im-
pose excessive costs on the construction of 
housing. How do the unions exercise and 
maintain this power? Can increased use of 
industrialized housing lessen the power of 
craft unions? What solutions to the present 181 
housing crisis are available and which are 
politically feasible? 
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I Labor as a Cost of Housing 
A Direct Costs - Union Control Over Wages and Labor Supply 
Construction unions have successfully exacted lame wage 
increases and imposed other cost increases on the housing 
industry, both because of the need for the product that 
the industry sells and because of the atomized nature of 
the industry itself. 
The product which the residential construction industry 
sells is housing, for which Americans spent about 29% 
of total personal consumption expenditures in 1970.12 
Conventionally-built new housing has few substitutes, 
which makes demand for housing relatively price inelastic. 
There is evidence that some substitutes are now being 
created. One is the mobile home which now constitutes 
about 20% of new housing starts in the United States 
today.1 3 But there remains considerable popular resist-
ance to mobile homes and attempts by communities to 
keep them out are not uncommon.14 Moreover, mobile 
homes are unfit for large families and thus for large 
segments of the lower income population. 
Another substitute for new housing is the present housing 
stock. As prices rise, we expect people to stay in older, 
even substandard buildings rather than buy new homes. 
The elasticity of demand for conventionally-built new hous-
ing may also be affected by the propensity of people to 
adopt higher-density living patterns as high ratios of liv-
ing space per person become too expensive. However, 
these effects will be limited by the introduction and en-
forcement of stringent housing codes which encourage 
abandonment of older housing or require minimum 
floor space. 15 In the last analysis, the demand for housing 
remains less elastic in terms of demand response to price 
increases than the demand for many other important 
goods. Where demand is relatively inelastic, we can expect 
less economic restraint on labor to demand, and employ-
ers to resist, higher wages and benefits. 16 
The ability to control wage rates by reliance on price 
inelasticities of demand among housing consumers is one 
part of the process by which high wages are maintained. 
The other key element of the equation is union control 
over the supply of labor. As economist D.Q. Mills points 
out: 
Economists have often asserted the theoretical 
identity, in a partial equilibrium model, of con-
trol of the supply of labor and control over the 
wage rate. However, where supply cannot be 
controlled but some large degree of influence 
over the wage rate is available, secondary mar-
kets are likely to exist. This is particularly the 
case in construction, where entry of firms is 
relatively easy and many building trades skills 
are widely distributed among the work force. 
The secondary market must be kept at rates of 
operation that are not threatening to the union. 
This may require either rates of compensation 
which do not diverge too greatly from the com-
petitive market equilibrium or actual devices of 
supply restriction. Control over the price (i.e., 
wage scale) alone is not sufficient. Alternatively, 
for control over the wage rate to be equivalent 
to direct supply restriction, control must be 
exercised over all transactions so that they 
occur· at the specified rate.17 
Building trades union control over the supply of labor is 
assured in an industry composed of small producers and 
large unions. The National Commission on Urban Prob-
lems or Douglas Commission described the industry in 
its report: 
Homebuilding in the United States, in many of 
its aspects, is an example of the small-scale, 
handicraft type industry. 
... [M) ore than almost any other industry it 
produces under conditions similar to those com-
mon a half century ago. 
The building industry is a loose conglomeration 
of small participants who come together on a 
project-by-project basis. The initiator of the 
construction process brings together architects, 
engineers, and a general contractor for a given 
building development ... 
The typical contractor still builds only a few 
houses each year and farms out a large part of 
his work to specialized subcontractors. He might 
take charge of the foundations and the shell 
himself, but will have separate subcontractors 
for the plumbing and the electrical work. He 
hires painters and bricklayers and numerous 
other craftsmen to perform specialized tasks. 
Sometimes he lets these jobs out on subcontract, 
while remaining responsible for the purchase 
and flow of materials and for the general con-
duct of the work. When each participant com-
pletes his particular role, he leaves. Generally 
speaking, the organization is assembled for one 
job only. 18 
Statistics vividly illuminate the extent to which the in-
dustry is fractionated. In 1969, there were about 903,000 
firms in the contract construction industry.19 Of that 
number, 723 ,000 were sole proprietorships, 5 1,000 were 
active partnerships and 129 ,000 were active corporations.20 
In 1969, 676,000 or more than 93% of all proprietorships 
had under $100,000 in receipts for that year. Forty-nine 
thousand of the partnerships earned less than $500,000 
in 1969, with 38,000 of that number, earning less than 
$100,000. While corporations tended to generate more 
receipts per firm, about 80% or 102,000 of the total, still 
earned less than $1 million.21 Since the construction in-
dustry is more than 50% larger than the iron and steel and 
automobile industries combined, 22 the extraordinary 
small-scale of the participants remains astonishing. 
Facing these 900,000 firms are seventeen unions,23 oper-
ating through a few thousand tightly disciplined locals 
which collectively exercise almost complete control over 
the supply of skilled labor through a variety of devices. 
These include racial discrimination, long apprenticeship 
training requirements, high entry fees, and, most impor-
tant, exclusive control of the hiring hall.24 Of the 2.5 
million contract construction industry employees who 
belong to unions, about 60% belong to referral locals.25 
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(Of the approximately 3.4 million workers in contract 
construction, then, 44% are subject to hiring hall control.)26 
Professor Ralph K. Winter has described the hiring hall 
as a technique for controlling labor supply: 
In the construction industry, the ability to con-
trol the number of people admitted to the hiring 
hall gives unions the power to eliminate much of 
the employment benefit tradeoffproblem. Be-
cause a hiring hall union need not admit all 
comers but can merely add temporary workers, 
it can raise wages substantially without fearing 
that the constituents of union leaders will be un-
employed. The hiring hall, therefore, significantly 
reduces the restraint so significant to industrial 
unions, the fear of unemployment among union 
members.27 
The relatively small size of contractors also makes impos-
sible economies of scale that could be attained by increas-
ing volume of production. Such economies would include 
lower labor costs if a permanent labor force were retained 
by a firm the year around. Lower salaries might be paid 
if some of the insecurity in the labor market for contract 
construction were eliminated.28 Other economies would 
be lower materials costs (since larger inventories could be 
kept and favorable terms with suppliers more easil;,' nego-
tiated), and lower overhead and profits per unit of con-
struction.29 However, the relative nonstandardization of 
the product itself makes such economies difficult to achieve 
except for large developers, and may explain the persist-
ence of small-scale construction.30 
Other implications of this atomization become obvious. 
In so fragile an industry, where one ill-timed strike can 
ruin a contractor, there is every incentive for employers 
to settle wage disputes even if to do so would result in 
substantial cost increases for the final product. In an in-
dustry where there are few, if any, traditional employer-
employee relationships, economic warfare is the rule 
rather than the exception. The contract constructionin-
dustry has consistently led all other industry groups in 
the number of work stoppages, reaching a peak in 1970 
with 1,137, about 1/5 of the total number throughout 
American industry that year. Yet employees in contract 
construction comprised less than 5% of the total number 
of employed Americans.31 
Thus, the need for the product which the construction 
industry produces and the smallness of builders in the 
industry combine to give well-organized craft unions 
power limited only by political and public opinion pres-
sures. This power has afforded workers in the construc-
tion trades union,s the highest gross average weekly and 
hourly earnings of any labor group in a single industry.32 
Wages have risen 43.6% between 1967 and 1972, again 
more than for any other labor group.33 Moreover, this 
rate of increase has been almost twice as much as the in-
crease in the cost of living in general and the cost of hous-
ing in particular.34 As an example of the penalty unions 
have been willing to exact when resistance to wage de-
mands is encountered, we need only note that during the 
last wage dispute in New York City, 75,000 unionists 
were able to tie up $2 billion in construction for nearly 
three months.35 
B Indirect Costs - Union Control over Conditions of 
Employment 
In addition to exercising control over wages and the supply 
of labor, the unions have been successful in regulating the 
conditions under which their members work and the 
composition of the workforce itself. The nature of these 
controls contributes in indirect ways to increases in the 
cost of housing, largely through reductions in labor force 
productivity. 
One conspicuous example of such antiproductive con-
trols is the restrictive work rule. There are several 
varieties: 
A concise listing which includes most of the 
current practices shows six varieties of make-
work or featherbedding. These involve: limiting 
the work load an employee may handle or the 
number of machines he may operate; requiring 
unnecessary work or that work be done more 
than once; prohibiting certain labor-saving tools 
or machinery from being used; restricting the 
duties of workers or enforcing less efficient 
working methods and standards; requiring un-
necessary standby workers or crews or an ex-
cessive number of workers; and compelling em-
ployers to grant excessive relief time. 36 
One estimate has been made that, on the average, such 
restrictive work rules raise labor costs by about 10 to 12 
per cent, with an increase in the final price of housing 
being around 2 to 3 per cent.37 Indeed, one report has 
shown that between 1964 and 1969, while compensation/ 
man-hour was increasing an average of 6.5% each year, 
productivity/man-hour was actually dropping approxi-
mately .7% to 1.8% each year (depending upon how out-
put estimates were measured).38 While productivity in 
the construction trades has been rising since 1969, the 
annual increase in productivity has been below that for 
American workers as a whole and certainly below in-
creases in annual construction wages. 39 
Unions also increase costs by resisting changes in building 
codes which mandate the use of certain materials in 
housing and other buildings. Of more than 8,000 local 
units of government with building codes surveyed by the 
National Commission on Drban Problems, 42% prohibited 
"off-site, prefabricated or pre-assembled combination 
drain, waste and vent plumbing systems for bathroom 
installation." Sixty-three per cent prohibited the use of 
plastic pipes in drainage systems. In the words of the 
Commission: 
Among the more important methods of reducing 
building costs is the prefabrication or offsite 
assembly of plumbing or electrical units. This 
makes the use of mass production and assembly 
line techniques possible; work can be done more 
183 
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efficiently through specialization and the divi-
sion of labor; and much of the work is freed 
from the added costs due to time lost because 
of inclement weather because it is done indoors.40 
While it would be unfair to charge unions with having 
been responsible for the initial promulgation of now eco-
nomically inefficient building code provisions, unions do 
oppose changes which reduce the amount of on-site as-
sembly and manufacture presently done by their 
members.41 
Still another way in which unions indirectly work to in-
crease the cost of housing is racial discrimination in union 
membership. To the extent that discriminating among 
various units of labor on bases other than productivity 
results in a decrease of productivity, racial discrimination 
imposes costs in terms of reduced productivity that aug-
ment the rise in housing costs.42 By refusing to comply 
with antidiscrimination laws, unions can also increase the 
cost of housing that is delayed because of their refusal. 
For instance, Sheetmetal Workers Local 28 of New York 
City, the highest paid union in that city, held up $200 
million in city-subsidized construction because it refused 
to comply with Mayor Lindsay's Executive Order 31, 
mandating affirmative action pledges to increase minority 
group representation in the craft unions.43 
Finally, unions may increase costs by forcing contractors 
to negotiate with each union separately. Under New 
York State law, for example, cities must negotiate four 
different contracts on projects above $50,000, covering 
general construction, heating and air conditioning, plumb-
ing, and electrical work.44 The result of multiple con-
tracts is higher costs for preliminary planning and nego-
tiation of contracts. It has been estimated that New York 
City could save about $70 million annually if it were per-
mitted to negotiate with one general contractor on all 
aspects of the building project.4s 
C Government Support for Union Power 
Statutes and court decisions abet the unions' ability to 
insulate themselves from the impact of competing labor 
pools and/or labor-saving materials and techniques. 
Any analysis of government aid to the construction trades 
unions must begin with a discussion of the bete noire of 
those alarmed at craft union power, the Davis-Bacon A ct, 46 
and the regulations promulgated thereunder.47 The Act 
provides, inter alia, that on every contract in excess of 
$2000 for construction "to which the United States or 
the District of Columbia is a party," the wages paid to 
workers shall be those "prevailing for the corresponding 
classes of laborers and mechanics employed on projects 
of a character similar to the contract work in the city, 
town, village, or other civil division of the State (or in 
the District of Columbia] in which the work is to be per-
formed ... " The wage rate mandated includes the basic 
hourly rate of pay plus employer contributions to pension 
funds, disability and sickness insurance and the like; the 
law covers both contractors and subcontractors. 
Davis-Bacon Act "prevailing wages" must be paid 
on projects undertaken under some 63 Federal statutes48 
including the National Housing Act of 1934,49 (mortgage-
insured private housing); the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, so 
(public housing); the Housing Act of 1949, si (urban re-
newal); the Housing Act of 1959, s2 (inter alia, housing 
for elderly and handicapped low- and moderate-income 
persons); the Housing Act of 1964, s3 (inter alia, housing 
for domestic farm labor); and the Urban Growth and 
New Community Development Act of 1970, s4 (new towns). 
Furthermore, such wage requirements have been imposed 
on projects built under other federal statutes relating to 
construction of schools, airports, community health cen-
ters, clinics and hospitals, libraries, and sewage treatment 
plants - all services which complement new housing. 
In addition, some 34 states and the District of Columbia, 
including California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York and 
Pennsylvania have passed "little Davis-Bacon" laws, and 
at least one author has noticed the high correlation be-
tween states with strong construction trades unions and 
states with Davis-Bacon-type laws.ss For the most part, 
these laws have been upheld as constitutional.
56 
When the Act was first considered and enacted in l 931,s7 
it protected the generally higher wages paid to Northern 
workers from being undercut on federal and federally-
subsidized construction by lower bids from contractors 
using low-wage, Southern, generally nonunion employees. 
By requiring that all wages be paid at an ambiguously de-
fined {though unambiguously determined) "prevailing 
wage" rate in the area where the construction was to 
take place, the competitive advantage that would other-
wise inure to users of low-wage employees was partially 
eliminated. Today, the Davis-Bacon Act continues to in-
sulate unionized labor in a paFticular locality from 
cheaper competitors. 
The protection of union wage rates from competition 
follows from the way the Act is administered. The Sec-
retary of Laborss is charged by the Act with determining 
what constitutes prevailing wage rates, and pursuant to 
that authority, the Department has prescribed the fol-
lowing test: 
The term 'prevailing wage rate' for each classi-
fication of laborers and mechanics which the 
Solicitor [sic] shall regard as prevailing in an 
area shall mean: 
The rate of wages paid in the area in which the 
work is to be performed, to the majority of 
those employed in that classification in con-
struction in the area similar to the proposed 
undertaking; 
2 In the event that there is not a majority paid at 
the same rate, then the rate paid the greater 
number: Provided, such greater number consti-
tutes 30 per cent of those employed; or 
3 In the event that less than 30 per cent of those 
so employed receive the same rate, then the 
average rate. s9 4
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Under the Labor Department's test, as long as a union 
has organized at least 30% of the identifiable contract 
construction workforce in the area where the federal or 
federally-subsidized construction is to take place, it is 
possible - as long as the lower wages of the other 70% 
are not easily ascertainable - for that union to insure that 
there will be no wage competition that threatens demand 
for their own labor services. With 25 ,000 wage determi-
nations made each year, with some of those wage deter-
minations covering up to 100 job types on a particular 
project,60 the temptation to look at area collective agree-
ments for prevailing wage rates appears too great to 
overcome. 
An example of the difference paying the "prevailing 
wage rate" can make, was given by the National Associ-
ation of Home Builders, in a statement prepared for the 
Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs.61 
Labor costs on a "236" development built in the Dallas-
Fort Worth, area were compared with those on a conven-
tionally financed project built at the same time, two miles 





















Professor John Gould of the University of Chicago has 
given convincing proof that "the Davis-Bacon Act (and 
related prevailing wage legislation) would tend to increase 
wages even if local wages were accurately reflected in the 
determination of prevailing wages." He argues: 
This is because the Davis-Bacon Act per se may 
alter the market structure and the nature of 
competition in the industry ... 
... The Davis-Bacon Act and related laws tend 
to make government demand (and government 
assisted demand) for construction projects rela-
tively inelastic (or unresponsive) to wages. In 
other words, the act tends to decrease the gov-
ernment's bargaining power by disallowing the 
possibility of withholding contracts from high 
wage bidders if these bidders can establish their 
wage as 'prevailing.' This tendency is augmented 
by the bias toward inappropriately high prevail-
ing wage determinations, but it would occur in 
any situation in which the government is pre-
vented from searching out the' lowest bidder. 62 
All iri all, it is estimated that the Davis-Bacon Act adds 
approximately 5 to 15% to the cost of projects affected 
by it.63 
The courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have aug-
mented the unions' power to raise the costs of housing 
by permitting them, under certain vaguely prescribed 
circumstances, to prevent through contract provisions 
the use of prefabricated materials on job sites. In the 
landmark case, National Woodwork Manufacturers As-
sociation v. NLRB,64 the Court upheld an agreement be-
tween the carpenters' union and a general contractor that 
" ... No member of this District Council will handle ... 
any doors ... which have been fitted prior to being fur-
nished on the job ... " 65 The National Woodwork Manu-
facturers Association contended, that this provision was 
a violation of the National Labor Relations Act's section 
8(e), which provides: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor 
organization and any employer to enter into any 
contract or agreement, express or implied, 
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or 
agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, 
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in the 
products of any other employer, or to cease 
doing business with any other person, and any 
contract or agreement entered into heretofore 
or hereafter containing such an agreement shall 
be to such extent unenforceable and void ... 66 
The Supreme Court held that the "will-not-handle" con-
tract provision was not illegal if "the Union's objectivp 
was preservation of work for [the Contractor's] em-
ployees." The implication of such a ruling is obvious.67 
It permits unions to bar the use of prefabricated mate-
rials, imposing still another market constraint on the 
housing contractor. 
While unions are still prevented from coercing employers 
into refusing to handle prefabricated materials, in the 
course of negotiating contracts, they may insist that such 
so-called "hot cargo" provisions be inserted into the con-
tract as a condition of final settlement.68 And, as an 
answer to any argument that such "will-not-handle" 
clauses ought to be found invalid on the basis of the ob-
vious economic and technological inefficiencies that re-
sult therefrom, the Court, in Woodwork Manufacturers 
Association, made clear that these are not matters to be 
considered by the courts: 
Those arguments are addressed to the wrong 
branch of government. It may be 'that the time 
has come for a reevaluation of the basic content 
of collective bargaining as contemplated by the 
federal legislation. But that is for Congress ... •69 
The result of Government intervention on the side of the 
building trades unions is to further insulate highly paid 
unions from the impact of a greater supply of cheaper 
labor and from prefabricated products which might other-
wise displace the union's members. The twin threats -
increased supply of labor and decreased demand for labor 
through substitution of labor-saving production techniques 
- are largely obviated. 
185 
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II The Unions vs. Industrialized Housing 
Programs like HUD's "Operation Breakthrough" begun 
in 1969, represented an attempt by the Federal Govern-
ment to spread the gospel of industrialized housing.70 In 
the words of its chief apostle, former Secretary Romney: 
Operation Breakthrough was undertaken for the 
purpose of eliminating the constraints that pre-
vent the voluntary production of housing in this 
country from using modern methods of produc-
ing and financing and selling housing the way 
other products are financed and sold. 71 
It was hoped that industrialized housing might break the 
stranglehold which the trades unions held on construc-
tion costs. 
Since industrialized housing is not in widespread use in 
this country, it is difficult to estimate the impact of its 
spread on American workers. However, the mobile home 
industry, because it uses many of the production tech-
niques that would be used in industrialized or modular 
housing, may provide a model for future industrialized 
construction on which to base an estimate. Indeed one 
mobile home producer has reported that it could imme-
diately convert one-third of its production capacity to 
output of modulars.72 An observer of the mobile home 
industry has written: 
The cost of labor runs to about 10 per cent of 
total costs, compared to about 25% for a con-
ventional single-family house, excluding land. 
One of the industry's real advantages is that it 
pays on the basis of an industrial wage rather 
than a building-craft wage. 73 
The difference between wages that must be paid industrial 
workers and building trades workers can be substantial. 
In California, with a 1971 factory-built housing law per-
mitting industrialized housing anywhere in the state re-
gardless of local codes;'a the differentials may be on the 
order of 25% for skilled labor, 40% for semiskilled labor, 
and 50% for unskilled labor.74 
What is more, there would be a reduction in the level of 
skills needed among the labor force members were sys-
tems building with factory built housing to be used. 
"Fully 65 per cent of the workforce can be rapidly 
trained unskilled labor."75 With lower levels of training 
and less specialized skills, wages become responsive to 
productivity gains rather than to union power. 
Even where wages might not be reduced, perhaps because 
factory workers themselves organize into strong unions, 
there is some indication of a reduction in man-hours re-
quired per unit of construction. Levitt Homes, the largest 
producer of conventional housing in America, estimates 
that for every 250 man-hours now used in construction 
"field" work, 150 man-hours could be substituted in the 
factory. 76 The number of man-hours required in construc-
tion of multi-family dwelling would be reduced from an 
average 1314 man-hours per thousand square feet to 
762.77 The average 21 weeks it now takes to construct a 
single-family house 78 could be reduced to as few as two 
days.79 
If labor costs were reduced substantially, there would be 
significant savings to the ultimate purchaser not only in 
the initial shelter costs but also in the total cost to him 
of owning his home (essentially shelter costs plus operat-
ing costs including property taxes, insurance premiums, 
utilities and maintenance). Lower construction costs 
would lead to a lower home price (or a better home for 
the same price) producing lower financing costs and a 
lower property valuation for property tax purposes. 
What becomes manifest from this analysis is that the 
present organization of the construction industry labor 
force would be rendered obsolete or inefficient by the 
widespread use of industrialized housing techniques. The 
monopoly power now possessed by the unions would be 
considerably reduced. There would be fewer producers, 
as economies of scale permit present large producers to 
squeeze out or absorb the smaller producers. And resist-
ance to wage demands would stiffen as the ability to sur-
vive the costs of strikes, slow-downs, and physical intimi-
dation increased. It is therefore unlikely that the present 
unions would cooperate in any effort to speed the shift 
to industrialized housing. Present restrictive work prac-
tices evidence the opposition to encroachments upon 
union control over the production process that prefabri-
cated housing techniques represent. 
III Strategies for Change 
The primary aim of those who. seek to reduce union 
power in the construction industry is to make the price 
and supply of labor subject to market pressures. A num-
ber of strategies might be employed.80 
One might attempt to enforce limits on wage increases, 
by simply prohibiting wage increases above certain fixed 
percentage levels. This the Federal Government has at-
tempted to do with the Construction Industry Stabiliza-
tion Committee, established in April 1971, and continued 
under Phase 111.81 One risk inherent in this approach is 
that wage controls may lead to non-cash payments (e.g., 
guarantees of employment) from employer to worker. If 
this results, controls aimed at wages alone will not de-
crease the growing net wealth transfers made to craft 
labor, but will affect only the form of those transfer pay-
ments. Nevertheless, to the extent that wage controls pre-
vent unions from reaping monopoly wages, their incentive 
and ability to restrict the labor supply is diminished. 
Applying wage controls to construction workers raises 
some nettlesome administrative problems particularly in 
fixing the sizes of acceptable wage increases. First, it is 
hard to measure productivity in the construction industry 
6
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because of the nonstandardization of the product. Sec-
ond, any wage determination must take account of some 
unique characteristics of the quality of work in the in-
dustry. Employment in the industry is highly seasonal, 
and unemployment extremely high. In addition, construc-
tion workers have a very high injury frequency rate.82 
Thus any wage determination must take into account the 
insecurity and danger of employment in construction. 
Another way to reduce the price of labor is to repeal the 
Davis-Bacon Act and its counterparts in the several states. 
A Senate bill, S. 3654, introduced into the 92nd Congress 
by Senator John Tower of Texas, would abrogate Davis-
Bacon provisions in the National Housing Act of 1934 
(the basis of Federal support of privately-built low- and 
moderate-income housing) and the United States Housing 
Act of 1937 (the basis of Federally-subsidized low-income 
public housing).83 Such legislation would put some pres-
sure on unions to hold wage demands down to a more 
competitive level. 
An indirect way to reduce costs is to ban "work preserva-
tion" or "will-not-handle" agreements between contractors 
and unions and to eliminate housing code provisions which 
permit such anti-prefabrication arrangements. Senator 
William Brock of Tennessee introduced such a bill in the 
Senate last year, which would permit persons "aggrieved" 
by such contract or code provisions to sue in a U.S. Dis-
trict Court for injunctive relief, and in some cases dam-
ages.84 Though this law would apply to only HUD-
assisted housing, its impact could be quite substantial, 
especially in light of the rapid spread of non-union private 
construction.85 Removal of these restrictive contract 
clauses and housing code provisions would force unions 
to calculate the costs they impose by prohibiting labor-
displacing techniques which could be substituted at lower 
cost. 
A final strategy may lie behind the actions of the present 
Administration. In ending housing subsidies, President 
Nixon may have undercut the ability of unions to obtain 
high wages by removing the artificially high demand for 
housing that such subsidies created. By reducing mort-
gage interest rates to as low as one percent for owners of 
low- and moderate-income multifamily rental or coopera-
tive units (under the "236" program) or owner-occupied 
single-family units (under the "235" program); by sub-
sidizjng property insurance in high-risk areas (under 
HUD's "FAIR" (Fair-Access-to-Insurance) program);86 
by reducing down payments on housing to as low as $200 
(again, the "235" program); and by giving rent supple-
ments to poor families in order to rent new or rehabili-
tated FHA-assisted housing,87 the government artificially 
stimulated demand. A shift upward in the demand for 
housing, given a fixed labor supply, could atcount for the 
increase of over 76% in hourly wages of contract em-
ployees between 1969 and December, 1972.88 Faced 
with rising housing demand, the potential resistance to 
such wage demands was absent or buried beneath the 
Federal push for a decent home for everyone. By cutting 
back on demand, the President may have stiffened resist-
ance to wage increases. 
There are a number of serious problems with implement-
ing any of the strategies discussed. The first involves the 
impact on the size of the labor pool. Although suspending 
the Davis-Bacon Act, prohibiting restrictive work prac-
tices, or eliminating subsidies would reduce the wealth of 
those within the union labor pool, the ultimate effect 
might be to make the unions even more exclusionary in 
their admissions or selection process. Individuals likely 
to be excluded are those in the lower wage categories, 
the younger members and nonwhites. One way to deal 
with this contraction of the work force is to eliminate 
the power of the trades unions to control the supply of 
labor. This would mean more active Gover'nment scrutiny 
of union racial discrimination, entry fees, and the hiring 
hall. The Federal Government could also assume the costs 
of training people for the various crafts: Presently, that 
cost is borne by the contractors (who are usually committed 
by contract to hiring so many apprentices per journeymen 
on construction jobs), or by the prospective employees 
themselves. The present system thus ensures a relatively 
small supply of labor. Lloyd Ulman presents one justifi-
cation for shifting the costs of training to the government: 
... to the extent that individuals must incur the 
costs of their own training - especially when 
the skills to be acquired would make them more 
valuable to other employers as well as their own 
- there is a case for subsidizing the training of 
poorer individuals and particularly of those who 
are likely targets of discrimination. Such indi-
viduals, as Lester Thurow has pointed out, are 
likely to have exceptionally high rates of time 
preference precisely because they are poor - so 
that the marginal utility to them of a dollar in 
wages foregone during the training period is ex-
ceptionally high - and because their opportu-
nities are limited - so that the private return on 
a training investment is likely to be exception-
ally low. Moreover, there can be little doubt that 
any would-be borrower for whom discrimination 
has made the labor market imperfect would find 
himself regarded as an exceptionally poor risk 
by any potential lender in the capital market. 
Subsidies, even if provided on a scale sufficient 
to eliminate or over-compensate for the direct 
and indirect costs of training, cannot by them-
selves overcome the obstacles to career develop-
ment thrown up by poverty and discrimination, 
but they would in principle play a useful role in 
helping to neutralize those disadvantages. 89 
By increasing the supply of qualified craftsmen, and re-
quiring that unions accept as members everyone certified 
through a Government-training program, union control 
over the supply of labor would be curtailed. 
187 
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Another difficulty with these strategies lies in the nar-
rowly economic perspective from which they approach 
the problem. For example, shifting more to industrialized 
housing would make the work of present craftsmen more 
like that of the assembly-line worker. The result would 
be to make the work of present construction industry 
employees more tedious, more specialized, and more in-
significant in relation to the entire production process 
even as it becomes less seasonal, less dangerous, and more 
productive. The sacrifice of the individual's sense of 
pride and control over his work is a social cost which 
must be taken into account in any comprehensive analysis. 
The foregoing discussion has greatest relevance for pro-
posals to eliminate work rules that promote inefficiency 
and curtail labor supply. Even if restrictive work prac-
tices do prevent efficiencies in building construction, 
they may also assert the feeling of employees that the 
integrity of the work they perform is jeopardized by pre-
fabricated materials or by assembly-line techniques. 
Work rules may embody the individual's sense of his own 
rights and liberties. Nevertheless, restrictive work rules 
do impose costs on the potential consumers of housing. 
There must therefore be some supervision over industry 
work rules to insure a minimum of maladjustment among 
the conflicting interests. Such supervision does not exist, 
but would if Congress delegated to a control agency like 
the National Labor Relations Board the power to desig-
nate some work rules as illegal or non-bargainable. 
No discussion of the problem posed by the construction 
trades unions could conclude without some mention of 
the present and substantial political power of these 
unions. It is not likely that this Administration will 
lightly undertake action that would diffuse the economic 
power of its allies. Those in Congress and in the state leg-
islatures may also be unwilling to take on this problem -
conservatives because of the attraction which labor sup-
port now has, liberals because of a need to assuage the 
anger of allies straying from the fold. Because of their 
high visibility and tight discipline, the construction unions 
are presently in a powerful position and those who would 
seek to make those unions more susceptible to market 
forces may find the political barriers high. 
Despite these obstacles, the goal of providing a decent 
home within the reach of every American household 
stands. Indeed, behind this analysis lies the belief that 
the country is slipping further from this goal, and that a 
crisis exists in the area of low- and moderate-income hous-
ing. As a consequence, it remains our obligation to think 
about solutions to the crisis that the present economic 
tyranny of the craft unions helped to create. 
Low- and moderate-income housing is generally 
that occupied by households earning less than 
$10,000 per year. I have selected this figure 
somewhat arbitrarily, but it does describe the 
economic circumstances of families occupying 
"236" housing, infra note 6. See 19 70 HUD 
Statistical Yearbook, Table 134, "Characteristics 
of Households Certified for Subsidy in Section 
236 Housing Through December 31, 1970." 
(1970). 
2 Mr. Brennan was an early supporter of President 
Nixon. New York Times, September 9, 1972, at 
11. Later that month, he and the leaders of nine 
of the biggest craft unions in New York State 
formally announced their active support of the 
Republican Presidential ticket, New York Times, 
September 27, 1972, at 34 and New York Times, 
September 28, 1972, at 52. 
3 These antidiscrimination programs are typified 
by the so-called "Philadelphia Plan," 41 C.F.R. 
§ 60-1, which was issued by the Secretary of 
Labor on June 27, 1969, pursuant to Executive 
Order 11246. That plan's validity was upheld in 
Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. 
Hodgson, 442 F .2d 159 (3d Cir., 1971), cert. 
den. 404 U.S. 854 (1971). For a history and dis-
cussion, see Note, The Legalify of the Philadel-
phia Plan, 4 Univ. S.F. L. Rev. 373 (1970). 
4 The announcement of the housing subsidy mora-
torium was reported N.Y. Times, January 9, 
1973, at l. The moratorium also included a hold 
on applications for a variety of other Federal 
programs, including water and sewer grants, 
open space grants and public facility loans. The 
Administration ended future cutrate housing 
loans for low-income rural families, "programs 
providing credit for farm labor housing, rural 
rental and cooperative housing and grants to 
small communities for building water and sewer 
systems." Id. 
5 New York Times, December 23, 1972, at 10. 
Total estimated subsidized new construction 
during 1972 was about 452,000, of which 
14 7 ,000 were new one- to four-family homes 
built under "235" subsidies and the remaining 
new construction primarily multifamily dwellings 
built pursuant to the "236" program. Another 
52,000 dwelling were rehabilitated, again pri-
marily under the "235" and "236" programs .. 
Message from the President of the United Stifles, 
"Fourth Annual Report on National Housing 
Goals," 92nd Cong., 2nd Session, House Doc. 
92-319 (June 29, 1972), Appendix B, Table B-3, 
at 46. 
6 These subsidies are contained in the National 
Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., 
as amended, most particularly the "235 Pro-
gram," 12 U.S.C. § l 715z, as amended, and the 
"236 program," 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1, as amended, 
both of which were added by the Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1968, P.L. 90-448. 
For the legislative history of the Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1968, see 1968 U.S. 
Code, Cong. and Admin. News, p. 2873 et seq. 
The "235" and "236" programs, which formed 
the bulk of the subsidies on which builders of 
low- and moderate-income housing relied, were 
considered by the Administration to be too costly 
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for the return. On the cost side, the mortgage 
insurance subsidy of the "235" program was 
estimated to have cost through the end of this 
Fiscal Year 1973 about $428 million; the interest 
reduction subsidy payments involved in the 
"236" program during this Fiscal Year 1973, 
were estimated to reach about $190 million. See 
I 972 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, 
p. 353-357 (U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget, Washington, D.C., 1972). 
7 New York Times, January 9, 1973, at 19. 
8 The coalition includes the National Tenants Or-
ganization, National Rural Housing Coalition, 
National Housing Conference, National Gov-
ernors Conference, National Association of 
Home Builders, National Association of Building 
Manufacturers, National Urban League, Mort-
gage Bankers Association of America, League of 
Women Voters and the National League of Cities 
and Conference of Mayors. New York Times, 
January 6, 1973, at 12. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Mr. Romney, in announcing the housing subsidy 
moratorium, said that the suspension "would 
as demand is not absolutely price inelastic, i.e., 
as long as E:i=O. One economist has calculated 
the elasticity of demand for non-farm housing 
to be about "minus 1 ;"i.e., a 10% rise in price 
will lead to a 10% decline in demand. See Rich-
ard C. Muth, "The Demand for Non-Farm Hous-
ing," in Arnold C. Harberger (ed.), The Demand 
for Durable Goods ( 1960). Others have found 
price elasticity of demand for housing to be an 
almost infinitesimal "minus 0.08,' i.e., a 10% 
rise in price will lead to a decline in demand of 
only 0.008%. See James S. Duesenberry and 
Helen Kistin, "The Role of Demand in the Eco-
nomic Structure," in Wassily Leontieff (ed.), 
Studies in the Structure of the American Econ-
omy (1953). The true answer is probably closer 
to Muth's, whose study has remained the most 
comprehensive yet undertaken and considers, for 
purposes of calculation of price elasticity, the 
present major substitute to new housing - viz., 
the present housing stock. However, for pur-
poses of our discussion, we have taken the view 
that where the present stock is itself substandard, 
such a substitute is unacceptable on public pol-
icy grounds. For the best discussion this student 
could find concerning the whole concept of elas-
ticity of demand - from the point of view of 
one not mathematically inclined - see M. M. 
Bober, Intermediate Price and Income Theory, 
Rev. ed. (1962), 61-73. 
Plasterers' and Cement Masons' International 
Association of the United States and Canada; 
United Association of Journeymen and Appren-
tices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry 
of the United States and Canada; United Slate, 
Tile, and Composition Roofers, Damp, and 
Waterproof Workers Association; Sheetmetal 
Workers' International Association; International 
Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental 
Iron Workers; Laborers' International Union of 
North America; and United Rubber, Cork, Lin-
oleum, and Plastic Workers of America. In addi-
tion, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America has or-
ganized most of those truckdrivers delivering 
materials and supplies to construction sites. See 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Out-
look Handbook, 370-420 (1966). 
24 "Union membership brings considerably 
steadier employment and much higher wages in 
these trades throug~ job control and limiting 
entry into the trade. In achieving these benefits, 
many referral unions take over the traditional 
management prerogative of determining in large 
measure who will enter the trade and when and 
where he will work. 
have no effect on basic Federal Housing Admin-
istration programs of mortgage assistance, al-
though there might be an increase in some pre-
mium rates because of anticipated plans to put 17 D. Q. Mills, Wage Determination in Contract 
Construction, 10 Ind. Rel. 72, 84-85 (Feb., 
1971) (footnotes omitted). 
the programs on a 'sound actuarial basis.'" New 
York Times, January 9, 1973, at 1. The "basic" 
FHA programs are those that assist mainly 
middle-class families to buy new homes. See Re- 18 
port of the National Commission on Urban 
Problems (The Douglas Commission), Building 
"Thus, the member is not only protected by the 
union, but is also dependent upon it for his em-
ployment ... " Hammerman, Minority 
Workers in Construction Referral Unions, 95 
Monthly Labor Review 17, 18 (May, 1972). 
the American City 94-107 (1968). 
11 New York Times, January 30, 1973, at 19. 
12 According to the U.S. Department of Commerce 
Report of the National Commission on Urban 
Problems, Building the American City, 431-432 
(1968). 
19 U.S. Bureau of the Census, I972 Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States, Table 745. (Herein-
after, I972 Statistical Abstract). 
25 National and International Labor Unions in the 
United States, I969 (B.L.S. Bulletin 1665, 
1970), Table 8, at 73. 
26 Current Labor Statistics, 95 Monthly Labor Re-
view, Tables 11, 14 (February, 1973). 
and the Health Insurance Institute, in 1970, 20 Ibid. 
27 Ralph K. Winter, Inflation, Employment Dis-
crimination and Hiring Halls in the Building 
Trades, February 17, 1971. (unpublished paper), 
at 6-7. Americans spent 14.8% of personal consump-
tion expenditures on basic shelter costs (mort- 21 Ibid., Table 749. 
gage debt service or rent) and another 13.9% on 
maintenance and operation of their homes. The 22 
American Consumer: Personal Expenditures, 
1973 Associated Press Almanac, at 439. 
13 See Mayer, Mobile Homes Move Into the Breach, 
81 Fortune Magazine 126, 127 (March, 1970). 
The author observes that as early as 1969: 
"Thirty-three.out of every hundred new single-
family dwellings.were.mobile homes. For every 
hundred regular single-family houses built, fifty 
mobiles rolled out the factories" at 127. 
In 1971, the revenues of the iron and steel in-
dustry were approximately $20,126,000,000. 
Those for the automotive industry were 
$40,600,000,000. The value of new construc-
tion, in 1971, was $109,399,000,000. See I972 
Statistical Abstract, Tables 1216, 892 and 1126. 
Indeed, about 10% of the Gross National Prod-
uct of this country was spent on construction 
in 1971, compared with 3.9% for automobiles. 
See, ibid., Tables 506 and 892. 
28 Hammerman, supra n. 24, has described the jobs 
of typical contract construction workers in this 
way: "the work is casual, intermittent and of 
limited duration with any particular employer; 
the trade offers fluctuating work opportunities 
due to seasonal, cyclical or other causes; the job 
is performed at scattered and varied worksites. 
Without unionization, these conditions of em-
ployment lead, almost inevitably, to great day-
to-day job insecurity," at 18. 
14 See, for example, Vickers v. Twp. Comm 'r. 
Gloucester Twp., 37 N.J. 232, 181A.2d129 
(1962). There, the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey upheld a prohibition against trailer camps 
anywhere within defendant-Township's boun-
daries. 
23 These unions include: Bricklayers, Masons and 
Plasterers' International Union of America; 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners 
29 See, generally, Maisel, Housebuilding in Transi-
tion, (1953); Herzog, The Dynamics of Large-
Scale Housebuilding, (1963). 
15 Mood, Lieberman and Sutermeister, Housing 
Code Standards: Three Critical Studies, National 
Commission on Urban Problems, Research Re-
port No. 19 (1969). 
16. There will always be at least some incentive for 
firms to resist increased wage demands as long 
of America; International Hod Carriers; Building 30 
and Common Laborers' Union of America; Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; 
International Union of Elevator Constructors; 
Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paper-
hangers of America in Western States; The Wood, 
Wire and Metal Lathers International Union; 
Contracting Plasterers' and Lathers' International 
Association; International Union of Operating 
Engineers; International Association of Marble, 
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Consider the following observation: "As ineffi-
cient as the present market arrangement is, its 
fragmentation and localized character serve an 
important function. They provide a choice of 
housing. Further, at present, the housing industry 
follows public opinion, it does not lead it (as 
the automobile industry does). Individual prefer-
ences are still the most important factor in home 
design.'' Hilary Sue Schultz, Lowering the Cost 
of Housing: ls Industrialized Housing Really the 
Answer?, Jan. 1, 1973 (unpublished paper on 
file at Yale Law School), at 22. 
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Bureau of Labor Statistics in February 
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heard of in New York City, see New York 
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York Times, July 2, 1972, at 22. 
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ments Before the Joint Economic Committee, 
92nd Cong., 2d Sess., Part 3 (February 4, 
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Table A. at 509. 
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This paper has largely neglected the other aspects 
of housing costs - viz., materials, financing and 
land - which tend to inhibit initial purchases of 
housing. Indeed some have argued that the em-
phasis upon wage rates as the cause of rising 
housing costs exaggerates the true impact of 
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wage rates. Consider, for instance, the following 
account of Congressional testimony of Frank 
Bonadio, Pr<'.sident, Building and Construction 
Trades Department, AFL-CIO: 
' ... [T) he ... assumption that soaring labor 
costs ... are the main reason for high and 
ever rising housing costs ... is false.' He pro-
ferred statistics that the cost of onsite labor 
as a percentage of the total cost of housing 
has actually gone down from 33% in 1949 
to 18% in 1969. Land, on the other hand, 
has risen from 11 % to 21 % and financing has 
risen from 5% to 10% in that same period. 
He says: 'Even ... a decrease in labor costs 
would not significantly lower the cost of 
housing. For example, a twenty percent de· 
crease in labor costs would only have a cor· 
responding four percent decrease in the 
monthly occupancy cost of the house. Con-
versely, a twenty percent increase in labor 
costs would only increase the monthly occu-
pancy cost of the home by four per cent. In 
contrast, an increase in finance charges can 
have a significant impact on the cost of hous-
ing. A one percent increase in the mortgage 
rate on a $20,000 20 year FHA mortgage 
will increase the average monthly payment 
of principal and interest by about ten per 
cent over the life of the mortgage.' 
Hearings on Improved Technology and Removal 
of Prevailing Wage Requirements, supra n. 36 at 
216-217. Settlement costs can add an average 
5.24 to 15.85% to the selling price of a single-
family residence. Between 1950 and 1967, 
"[the) price of building sites for one-family 
homes ... rose 600 per cent faster than the 
price of all consumer items." Materials costs, 
particularly lumber, have also registered sharp 
price increases since 1967. 
But for low- and moderate-income families, 
over the life of the contract negotiated in major 
construction settlements in the period 1961 to 
1968." (§ 6(a) of the Order; see, also,§ 6(b)). 
The Davis-Bacon Act could, at the option of the 
Committee, be suspended but only in so far as 
determinations under the various acts to which 
it applied would result in prevailing wage rate 
increases and determinations "in excess of that 
found to be acceptable in making determinations 
under that Act and related statutes."§ 5(a). The 
members of the Committee were to be twelve, 
appointed by the Secretary of Labor and were 
to include four representatives of labor in the 
construction industry, four representatives of 
the public, wi.th one of the latter group to be ap-
pointed chairman by the Secretary. The Chair· 
man of the Committee, since its inception and 
until he was elevated by President Nixon to 
head the Cost of .Living Council under Phase III, 
was John T. Dunlop, labor specialist from Har· 
vard and Dean of Harvard College. See New 
York Times, April 6, 1971, at 21, for the other 
original members of the CISC. Phase Ill, 
which was announced in Executive Order 11695, 
38 Fed. Reg. 1473 (Jan. 12, 1973) continues 
the Construction Industry S tabilizaton Com-
mittee,§ 5 of the Order, indicating that the Ad· 
ministration still feels that wages in the con-
struction industry are a problem. Cf. Regula-
tions promulgated implementing E.O. 11695 in 
38 Fed. Reg. 1489 et seq. (Jan. 12, 1973). 
82 1972 Statistical Abstract, Table 383. 
83 S. 3654, 92nd Con., 2nd Sess. (May 31, 1972) 
in Hearings, Senate Subcommittee on Housing 
and Urban Affairs, supra n. 36 at 8. 
84 S. 3373, 92nd Con., 2nd Sess. (March 17, 1972) 
in Hearings, Senate Subcommittee on Housing 
and Urban Affairs, supra n. 36, at 5. 
most of the barriers posed by_high financing and 85 
land costs could be significantly miti-
There is already evidence, particularly in the 
South and Southwest, that increasing use of 
non-union labor on construction projects is being 
made. New York Times, Feb. 10, 1972, at 29. 
According to Business Week, July 1, 1972, at 
gated. Land ·acquisition and development.costs 
couls be reduced from an average 31% of shelter 
costs in the case of a single-family detached 
home to an average 25% in the case of multi-
family, low-rise housing. As for mortgage costs, 
we have already discussed the impact of the 
"235" and "236" interest-subsidy and mortgage· 
insurance programs in terms of their removing 
financing costs as significant barriers to home 
ownership among moderate-income households. 
Thus, it is only in the area of construction costs 
(materials and labor) that controls need to be 
imposed or resource allocation made more effi-
cient. It seems clear that control over labor 
costs is justified because the classic demand/ 
supply model has been subverted by monopoly 
behavior by the building trades unions,. It ap-
14: "To union crafts, the spread of nonunion 
building has now become critical ... Within one 
week, recently, nearly $1 billion in new con-
struction was let to open-shop (nonunion) con-
tractors ... Altogether, AFL-CIO buildings-
trades unions now estimate that union-contract 
employers have lost more than $10 billion in 
contracts in the past three or four years. The 
National Constructors Ass'n., an employer 
group, estimates that 32% of all construction in 
1971 went to open-shop bidders." Business 
Week also said that although the trend was 
mostly in the South and Southwest, even in 
tightly-organized regions like New York City 
and its environs, open-shop maintenance and 
repair work was spreading. 
pears more likely that the dramatic increases in 
materials prices reflect classic demand-pull infla-
tion pressures rather than lirtificial or voluntary 
restraints on supplies. 86 See Urban Property and Reinsurance Act of 
1968, Act of August l, 1968, P.L. 90-448, 
Title XI, 82 Stat. 555. 81 Executive Order 11588 (April 3, 1971), 36 F.R. 
6339, 1971 U.S. Code, Cong., and Admin. News,
87 p. 2540, established a Construction Industry 
Stabilization Committee, empowered to review 
construction industry labor contracts and to en- 88 
sure that "those normally considered are sup· 
portable by productivity improvement and cost 
of living trends, but not in excess of the average 
of the median increases in wages and benefits 
12 U.S.C. § 170ls, as amended. 
In 1969, hourly wages of such workers averaged 
$4.79/hr. In Dec., 1972 (prelim. figures), aver-
age hourly wages were $6.29/hr. See Current 
Labor Statistics, 96 Monthly Labor Review, 
Table 18, at 21(Feb.,1973). 
89 Lloyd Ulman, Labor Markets and Manpower 
Policies in Perspective, 95 Monthly Labor Re-
view 22, (Sept., 1972). · 
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